

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

120 F47-049 #40

2 4 JUN 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Insurgency and Terrorism in El Salvador and Central America (e)

- 1. (8) The recent urban attack in El Salvador by terrorist insurgents, which resulted in the death of four US Marines and a number of private citizens, is another indication of the ongoing shift by the El Salvadoran guerrillas from unsuccessful guerrilla operations in the field to urban terrorism. The shift to urban warfare by the El Salvadoran guerrillas is a direct result of the success of Salvadoran Armed Forces in the field and can be expected to continue with increased intensity. The probable intent of the guerrillas is to relieve the pressure on their forces in the field by an increasingly heavy campaign of urban terrorism and terrorism against high value economic targets, and to reduce the degree of US involvement which they consider to be the principal factor in El Salvador's continuing military success. It is clear that as the guerrilla forces shift their tactics, the El Salvador government will need to cope with this new and enlarged threat, while at the same time denying insurgent success in the field by bringing increased pressure on the querrillas.
- 2. (S) In response to the death of the Americans, you have directed that steps be taken to:
 - a. (3) Immediately provide whatever intelligence assistance is necessary to President Duarte's government;
 - b. (II) Expedite the delivery of security assistance items on order by the Government of El Salvador, and;
 - c. (W) Furnish the Salvadoran Armed Forces with additional military assets which will help them prosecute their campaign against the communist guerrillas.
- 3. (S) With regard to intelligence collection, we believe the attack may have been planned and carried out by the elite special forces element of the FPL or the PRTC. The HQ element of the FPL is normally located in the Las Vueltas area of the Chalatenango Department.* We have specifically tasked our intelligence assets to focus collection efforts in those regions.

*The HQ element of the PRTC is normally located in San Vicente province.

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- 4. (S) With regard to security assistance, the Salvadoran combat capability has been substantially improved thorough equipment deliveries over the last 90 days. Delivery of additional equipment has been accelerated to sustain their current momentum. Details are at Enclosure A.
- 5. (S) To prosecute a stepped-up antiguerrilla campaign, the Salvadoran Armed Forces urgently need equipment beyond that currently programmed. USCINCSOUTH and American Embassy, San Salvador, in coordination with Minister of Defense Vidas Casanova and the Salvadoran military, have identified additional military assets needed to carry out these operations. This \$70M notional program, outlined in Enclosure B, includes a modest force expansion, improved night operational capability, police and security force improvements, increased tactical mobility and humanitarian activities. This program requires more examination, which we are expediting.
- 6. (S) The most significant problem faced by the Salvadorans in the current situation is the inability of their police forces to combat urban terrorism. The Salvadorans presently have neither the training capability nor equipment to make their police forces effective for the task. Therefore, we need in an interagency forum to address ways to offer to train Salvadoran police forces in counterterrorism operations. Further, these forces will need arms, communication equipment, and police vehicles to make their presence effective.
- 7. (S) From the broader perspective, the US objective is to stop the exportation of communist revolution by Nicaragua, the main source of support for insurgency in El Salvador. There are two additional requirements. Continuing support for the democratic freedom fighters in Nicaragua is important to the policy designed to alter the behavior of the Nicaraguan government. It is imperative that our public policy reflect that position, and that we continue to seek support in the Congress. Similarly, we need supplemental security assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama to strengthen the defense of those countries. A notional summary of a possible supplemental assistance program is provided at Enclosure C. We are also addressing the specific requirements and will provide them shortly.
- 8. (S) We are expediting the reprogramming of FY-84 and FY-85 RMTC funds as a result of a decision to close it. There are \$38.5 million available which will be reprogrammed for training in El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica. These additions are listed at Enclosure D.
- 9. (0) The JCS fully concur in the above recommendations.

Security Assistance Deliveries to El Salvador

Items that have been delivered to El Salvador in the past 90

days: Hughes 500 Helo Gunships

4 ea

C-47 Aircraft

3 ea

77 Foot Patrol Boat

1 ea

IR Suppressors for UH-1H

20 ea

Binocular M909

166 ea

Rifle Scope M845

102 ea

84 ea

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Monocular M911

516 ea

Compass

82 ea

Grenade Launcher M79

Recoilless Rifle

9 ea

Items already in the pipeline which are being expedited for delivery by 1 July 1975:

C-47 Aircraft

2 ea

UH-1H Helicopter

6 ea

Machine Gun M60

260 ea

Machine Gun M2

45 ea

Telephone TA312

300 ea

Test Set AN/USM281

6 ea

Test Set AN/USM207

5 ea

Signal Generator

6 ea

Radio AN/GRC160

89 ea

65 Foot Patrol Boat

l ea

Air Force Ammunition

1,072 metric tons

Army Ammunition

1,388 metric tons

Items already in the pipeline which also will be accelerated for delivery by 1 August 1985:

Mortar 81mm

28 ea

Mortar 60mm

30 ea

LAW M72A2

2,000 ea

Mine, M18Al

10,000 ea

I. SUBJECT: Supplemental Security Assistance Funding for El Salvador		
II. MAJOR POINTS. The following breakdown for proposed \$70.0M military supplement is provided.		
Α.	Force Expansion: Equipping, Trai	ning and Sustainment
	Training Armaments (crew served) Individual Equipment	1.0 4.0 7.0
В.	Tactical Mobility	
	Ground Transportation Armed Escort Helos Comalapa Dispersal Fuel	4.0 6.0 2.0 4.5
С.	Night Vision/Operations	÷
	Ground Units ACFT (3 Hughes 500, FLIR) Special Ammo	3.5 4.0 2.0
D.	Coast Interdiction	
	Patrol Boats Base Improvements BIM UGS (commercial) Repair Parts	3.0 2.3 1.0 2.5 1.0
E.	Military Humanitarian Activities	
	Military Hospital Enhancements Medical Supplies/Equipment Engineer Unit Civic Action	3.5 4.8 2.0 2.0
F.	Security Force Training/Equipping	6.0
G.	C3I	4.9
	C3I Facilities (including RPV downlink) Commo Equipment	5 - 10 - 10 + 15 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 - 10 -

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H. Rationale for High Priority Items

- ESAF's military success in the field has driven the guerrillas back into the cities where El Salvador's public security forces are weakest. Legislation prohibits training of police forces, but due to nature of mission, request rapid approval of funding, arms, communications and vehicles.
- CEAT (special unit) equipment and material needed to support counter-terrorist operations in urban areas.
- Success of Pink Team and airmobile operations warrants expansion of additional armed helos and FLIR as well as spare parts package for Hughes 500.
- Ambushes and small unit night operations are cornerstone to fighting guerrilla war. Require crew served weapons, PRC-77 radios, 10,000 Claymores and 12,000 LAWs.
- Medical supplies, equipment, and training necessary to care for critically injured (500 amputees). ESAF now fully support democratic process. Civic action in the form of clothing, medical supplies, well drilling, and water purification equipment will greatly assist population.

FY-85 SUPPLEMENTAL -- MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

EL SALVADOR: \$70.0M - MAP

COSTA RICA: \$8.85M

(\$8.8M - MAP)

(\$50,000 - IMET)

HONDURAS: \$79.2M - MAP

GUATEMALA: \$12.9M - MAP

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PANAMA: TBD

REPROGRAMMED RMTC FUND

\$ 1.5M closing costs

\$ 23M El Salvador

\$ 10M Honduras

\$ 4M Costa Rica

\$ 38.5M

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